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Introduction
The European Union (EU) wants to establish a commercial 
energy relationship with Central Asia. Making this strategic 
objective a reality is a complex and challenging undertaking. 
Although the prize is considerable given the region’s abundant 
reserves of oil and gas (not to mention uranium, which could 
be used to service the next generation of European nuclear 
reactors), the constraints are equally daunting. 
The principle underpinning the EU’s energy outreach towards 
Central  Asia  is  based  on  self-interest  and  focused  on  gas. 
The objective is to diversify supplies in order to reduce the 
dependence of EU member states on gas supplies from Russia, 
the potential volatility of which has been demonstrated by 
supply  disruptions  to  core  transit/customer  states,  notably 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia since 20061. These have 
followed  disputes  over  pricing,  payment  and  unregulated 
offtake. Yet, it is by no means certain that Central Asia is the 
answer to the EU’s wider diversification strategy. A number of 
alternatives that exclude Central Asia altogether have gained 
currency in policy-making circles for a variety of reasons. These 
include: development of the EU’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
importation  and  processing  capabilities;  new  supply  routes 
from Russia that bypass “problem” transit states (Nord Stream 
and South Stream pipeline projects being the most developed); 
reductions  in  long-term  EU  gas  demand  through  greater 
energy  efficiency;  improvements  in  gas  storage  capabilities; 
and the creation of an effective single gas market enabling the 
commercialisation of non-Russian gas from Western Europe to 
Russia-dependent EU member states through reverse flows, an 
emergency measure used successfully in the Russia-Ukraine 
dispute of January 20092. 
The purpose of this working paper is to assess where Central 
Asia fits into this broader debate. The broad assumption in this 
paper is that a southern corridor strategy encompassing Central 
Asia  is  still  somewhat  speculative  but  nevertheless  worth 
pursuing, bringing as it does tangible benefits to both regions 
and to connecting transit states. A number of subsidiary issues 
flow from this assumption. Firstly, the overall southern corridor 
strategy may not live or die with Central Asia’s involvement, 
important though the region’s reserve base is; Azerbaijan is far 
more pivotal to its success and both Georgia and Turkey present 
very different but substantial transit state challenges. Secondly, 
the EU has to decide how it can square its ambitions to be a 
normative foreign policy actor while dealing on a commercial 
basis with states such as Turkmenistan and, possibly down 
the line, Uzbekistan, where there are substantial deficits in the 
observance of human rights. Thirdly, timing is crucial. Turkmen 
foreign policy is presently in flux, accentuated by disruptions of 
gas exports to Russia since April 2009. Uzbekistan continues to 
resist further integration into the post-Soviet institutional space. 
If engagement is to proceed, then individual EU member states, 
EU energy companies and the EU as a collective actor must 
move more decisively to create a bridgehead into the region. 
Some  preliminary  qualifications  are  in  order.  Space  does 
not  permit  a  full  examination  of  the  Europe-Central  Asia 
energy relationship, so greater focus is imperative. Given the 
comparatively fungible and global nature of the oil market, and 
the EU’s own emphasis on diversification of gas supply, the paper 
will focus on potential gas trading between the two regions. Thus, 
although Kazakhstan is and will be the principal hydrocarbon 
exporter from Central Asia for the next two decades and has 
more developed and proximate gas fields, its export profile is 
and will be much more oriented towards oil than gas3. This is, 
in part, due to lower comparative production volumes, greater 
domestic gas usage, and also the close Russia-Kazakhstan gas 
trading nexus which will be difficult for the European Union 
to penetrate (see section III below). This paper will therefore 
dwell at greater length on the prospects for cooperation with 
Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, because they 
offer the greatest medium to long-term potential, albeit with 
greater political risk and infrastructural constraints. 
Moreover, the materiality of the southern corridor is likely to be 
affected by a number of external political factors. These include: 
the broader relationship between the EU and Russia; Ukraine’s 
domestic political environment and its short to medium-term 
foreign  policy  capabilities;  the  orientations  of  various  non-
EU “swing” states, notably Turkey and Serbia; the geopolitical 
dynamic  in  the  South  Caucasus  surrounding  Georgia  and 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement; and developments in other 
potential source states, notably Iraq, but also Iran and Egypt. 
These considerations must necessarily fall outside the scope of 
this paper, although they will inform its content. 
The remainder of the working paper is structured as follows: 
Section  I  sets  the  procedural  context  for  the  EU’s  energy  outreach 
to Central Asia since 1992. Section II focuses on the southern 
energy corridor, the mechanism by which EU-Central Asia 
energy relations might be concretised. In particular, it highlights 
the  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  risks  to  the  project’s  realisation. 
Section  III  considers  Central  Asia’s  specific  role  in  the  EU’s  energy 
strategy, assessing the contributions each gas exporting state 
might make, finding that Turkmenistan should be the EU’s clear 
strategic priority. Section IV analyses the specific opportunities 
and obstacles of bringing Turkmen gas west: these include 
political, commercial, infrastructural and trade factors, none of 
which, in themselves, are insurmountable but, taken together, 
present a formidable set of challenges. Section V considers how 
EU energy companies might build a sustainable and ethical 
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business offer in Turkmenistan, adumbrating various ground 
rules for effective commercial entry. Section VI sets out a list of 
recommendations for the EU to pursue to realise its objectives, 
and a short concluding section summarises the main report 
findings. 
I. Development of the EU’s Central 
Asia energy agenda
The European Community Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for 
Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013 adopted 
in June 2007 classifies diversification of energy supplies as a 
central  overall  external  policy  goal  of  the  EU,  stating  that  “Central 
Asia, with its significant hydrocarbon resources and favourable 
geographical location for transport routes to European markets, 
will play an important role in ensuring the EU’s energy supplies.” 
Beyond this, there is no further detail in the RSP as to how this 
might be achieved4. 
However, the Joint Progress Report (JPR) by the Council and 
the European Commission to the European Council on the 
implementation of the EU-Central Asia Strategy, released on 
24 June 2008, notes that “regional dialogue is intensifying in 
the framework of the Baku Initiative”, and that the “INOGATE 
[Inter-State Oil and Gas Transportation] mechanism remains 
the main tool in continuing to support cooperation on energy 
projects of mutual interest and in collaboration with leading 
international lending institutions”5. More specifically, the EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (ESSAP) arising from 
the Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review (SEER2), 
published on 13 November 2008, identifies the promotion of 
infrastructure  and  diversification  of  supplies  as  essential  to 
the EU’s energy needs. This head of the five point action plan 
includes various “priority infrastructure actions”, including: 
improving LNG and gas storage facilities; the completion of 
a Mediterranean gas ring; development of electricity and gas 
interconnections within Central and South Eastern Europe and 
the North Sea offshore electricity grid; and the creation of a 
southern gas corridor linking Caspian basin and Middle Eastern 
sources to the European Union6. 
The  importance  of  Central  Asia  as  an  energy  source  to 
SEER2 and the EU as a whole should, therefore, be put into 
perspective. Within the ESSAP, Central Asia’s contribution to 
the proposed southern gas corridor represents one half of one 
component  of  several  wider  infrastructure  action  priorities. 
Moreover, infrastructure development itself represents only 
one  component  of  five  broader  action  points,  which  also 
include intensive work to improve energy efficiency, build a 
framework of external energy relations, improve crisis response 
mechanisms,  increase  oil  and  gas  stocks  and  storage,  and 
make best use of the EU’s indigenous energy resources. Thus, 
although bringing Caspian gas directly into the EU’s energy 
mix is arguably the most geopolitically contentious aspect of 
the ESSAP, Central Asia cannot be described as an indispensible 
component of EU strategic planning on energy security. 
Although  2006  and  2007  were  undoubtedly  the  “game-
changing”  years  in  EU-Central  Asia  energy  relations,  it  is 
important  to  note  that  attempts  to  develop  commercial 
cooperation  predated  the  first  Russia-Ukraine  gas  crisis  in 
January 2006. Thinking on diversification of energy supplies 
can be traced back to the initiation of the Technical Aid to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme in 
1991. Further way stations were INOGATE’s inception in 1995, 
the Commission’s Green Paper on energy supply diversification 
published in 2000, and the Baku Initiative of November 2004, 
which was the first attempt to bring together all key supply and 
transit countries on the EU’s eastern flank including Russia, Iran, 
the Black Sea and Caspian Sea littoral states, as well as Central 
Asian states that would, at best, be marginal contributors to EU 
energy needs. 
The Baku Initiative set out the parameters of future engagement 
on  energy  issues:  harmonisation  of  legal  and  technical 
standards;  integration  of  energy  systems;  modernisation  of 
existing infrastructure and development of new infrastructure to 
improve safety and develop new supply interconnections; and 
promotion of the financing of new commercial projects. While 
this demonstrated the EU’s convening power and established 
a mechanism and process for future cooperation, it also laid 
bare the formidable obstacles for engagement. In statements 
annexed  to  the  conference  conclusions,  Azerbaijan  stated 
that it would not cooperate with Armenia while the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict remained unresolved; the Russian delegation 
expressed its formal reservations about the final communiqué; 
the Kazakh government reserved its position; the Armenian 
representation insisted that the process should be of a purely 
technical character; and no representative from the Turkmen 
government even attended the Baku conference7. 
The second ministerial conference, held in Astana in November 
2006,  illustrated  how  much  the  political  landscape  had 
been changed by the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 10 months 
previously. The number of participants narrowed. Iran dropped 
out of the picture; Russia attended only as an observer. States 
not integral to the supply and transit of Caspian gas to Europe, 
such as Armenia and Belarus, were designated as “partners”. A 
detailed Road Map annexed to the final ministerial declaration 
set out in much greater detail the objectives of the process and 
the mechanisms by which they might be achieved through a 
series of approved actions. The Road Map set out four broad 
medium-term objectives:
Converging of energy markets on the basis of the EU  1 
internal energy market principles taking into account the 
particularities of the Partner Countries;
Enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of  2 
energy exports/imports, supply diversification, energy 
transit and energy demand;
Supporting sustainable energy development, including  3 
the development of energy efficiency, renewable energy 
sources and demand side management;
Attracting investment towards energy projects of common  4 
and regional interest. 
The explicitly commercial dimensions of the Astana declaration 
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developing a new architecture of supply capable of transporting 
Central Asian gas from the eastern seaboard of the Caspian Sea 
to and through existing supply networks direct to the European 
market, in essence a Southern Energy corridor; (ii) to establish 
a framework, through the convergence of energy markets, for 
the purchase of Central Asian gas; (iii) to create the commercial 
conditions for greater up and mid-stream investment capable 
of generating sustainable medium-term supply volumes.
The RSP, SEER2 and the broader Southern Corridor strategy 
should therefore be viewed as the culmination of a longer 
accretive process of engagement, albeit given greater salience 
and urgency by structural increases in European gas demand, 
and increasing doubts over Russia’s long-term reliability as 
Europe’s principal source of natural gas. 
II. Realising the supply imperative: the 
Southern Corridor
The  proposed  Southern  Corridor  consists  of  two  pipeline 
projects. The centrepiece is the Nabucco pipeline from Erzerum 
in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria, designed to 
transport up to 31 bcm per year of gas from 2014-16 to the 
Central European market. This would cover approximately 5% of 
future European gas demand. The second is the Turkey-Greece-
Italy  Interconnector  pipeline  (TGII),  which  currently  supplies  0.5 
bcm per year to Greece, but would be expanded to supply 3.5 
bcm to Greece and 8 bcm to Italy by 2014 (see Appendix One). 
The  principal  source  of  gas  slated  to  make  the  projects 
commercially viable is Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz field 
operated by BP. Phase One of this project is onstream and 
currently supplying 8.5 bcm annually to Georgia, Turkey and 
Greece through the South Caucasus gas pipeline, a companion 
to the better known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. To 
make Nabucco a commercially viable prospect, an absolute 
minimum additional throughput of 8bcm per year will initially 
be needed for Phase One, with guarantees of additional supply 
from further sources. The development of Shah Deniz II, likely 
to come onstream in 2014 or later, should be able to meet the 
minimum initial conditions8. A major question thereafter is 
where additional volumes can be found to fill Nabucco in its 
second and third phases from 2016 and 2020 respectively to 
reach the target throughput of 31 bcm. Two separate regional 
supply complexes have been identified: the Greater Middle East 
and Central Asia, each of which is potentially problematic.
Moreover,  there  are  a  number  of  extrinsic  and  intrinsic 
complications to the realisation of the southern energy corridor. 
Nord Stream and South Stream are clearly factors, aggravated 
by the propensity of both large (Germany and Italy) and smaller 
(Hungary and Bulgaria) EU member states to “peel off” and 
make bilateral supply deals with Russia (see Appendix One for 
potential diversified pipeline routes for natural gas into the 
EU). The case has not been persuasively made to prioritise the 
southern energy corridor above other supply sources (LNG in 
form and the Maghreb as location). Indeed, it is a point of debate 
whether the principal emphasis of the EU should be a shift away 
from gas altogether towards renewable energy sources. 
Intrinsically, Turkey’s transit position has been problematic. Its 
demand for an offtake of 15% of Nabucco throughput for its 
own use at subsidised prices has been rejected by Azerbaijan, 
which is concerned that, in periods of lower domestic demand, 
surplus gas will then simply be resold by Turkey at a profit on 
the secondary market. The Turkish offer on price – reportedly 
around $140 per thousand cubic metres - is unacceptable even 
at a time of falling global gas prices, and the volumes demanded 
by Turkey, 8bcm per year from Shah Deniz II, are sufficient to 
undermine the overall rationale of the Nabucco project. Turkey 
has also linked the viability of the Southern Corridor to its stalling 
EU membership bid, in particular the opening of new accession 
chapters9. Intensive EU and private sector negotiation appeared 
to  have  softened  the  Turkish  position  by  summer  2009,  following 
a  “southern  corridor  summit”  hosted  by  the  Czech  EU  presidency 
in Prague in May 2009. Members of the Nabucco consortium 
seem to be prepared to offer Turkey guarantees on emergency 
supplies, while there has been some Turkish movement on 
price and volume, including an undertaking not to resell its 
share.  However,  unless  the  Intergovernmental  Agreement  (IGA) 
between the contracting parties, signed on 13 July 2009, can 
be underpinned by a Heads of Government Agreement (HGA) 
and supplemented by specific project support agreements and 
financing, the wider southern corridor strategy will remain a 
theoretical endeavour. 
Development of the southern corridor will also be contingent 
on  an  array  of  complex  geopolitical  calculations,  involving 
multiple players in the wider region, for some of whom supply 
of Central Asian gas to Europe is either a marginal concern or 
one that needs to be balanced against other considerations. The 
Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship is again critical. Turkey closed 
its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan 
during its conflict with Armenia over the disputed territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The unfolding diplomatic rapprochement 
between Turkey and Armenia, which has gathered momentum 
since autumn 2008, may lead ultimately to the normalisation of 
relations, possibly decoupled from a wider agreement on the 
status of Karabakh. On one level, there are considerable pay-offs 
for several parties: Turkey, alongside its advocates within the EU, 
will believe that it has removed one obstacle to EU accession, 
while increasing Turkey’s presence as a stabilising influence 
in the wider Caucasus region; Armenia would “localise” the 
Karabakh dispute and reduce its commercial and diplomatic 
isolation by forging new trade and transport links to the West. 
The new US administration and the EU will neutralise a foreign 
policy  issue  that  has  proved  sensitive  and  divisive  among 
various domestic constituencies. 
Against this, Azerbaijan may, in response, threaten to turn 
to Russia as its principal gas customer. When Gazprom CEO 
Alexei Miller met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on 2 
June 2008 in Baku, he reportedly sought to buy all current and 
future Azeri gas at competitive prices, an offer reiterated and 
developed by Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev on 8 
September 200810. While the MoU signed between Azerbaijan’s 
state energy company SOCAR and Gazprom on 27 March 2009, 
providing for gas sales at the Russian border and subsequent 
upgrading of the 228 km Baku-Novo-Filya pipeline, does not 
indicate a strategic realignment on Azerbaijan’s part, it certainly 
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between  Gazprom  and  SOCAR,  presenting  a  new  and  potentially 
damaging ingredient of “negotiating tension” for the EU11. 
The ongoing failure to secure a comprehensive and lasting 
international peacekeeping mandate in Georgia’s secessionist 
regions, following the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008, 
presents an important residual security concern for a key transit 
state. 
Assuming that these issues can be resolved, which is far from 
certain, sufficient gas has to be found. Iran, with its world-class 
gas reserve base, in excess of 28 tcm, has undoubted potential 
but broader geo/political factors are likely to prove prohibitive. 
At present, engagement with the Iranian regime is not on the 
agenda. Even if it were, the challenges to doing business are 
considerable. On a technical and commercial level, the Iranian 
government has proven to be a very difficult partner for Western 
investors. The gas sector itself is woefully underdeveloped to 
the point where, scarcely believable though it is, Iran is actually 
still a net importer of gas.
Iraq is a more realistic prospect. The reserves are believed to be in 
place but the legal environment for investors is far from settled 
and security concerns persist. Kurdish regional authorities and 
Iraqi central government each claim presumed competences 
over  the  ownership,  development  and  management  of 
hydrocarbon  resources  in  the  north  of  the  country  where 
Nabucco gas would be sourced. Considerable resources for 
investment will also have to be found, including the funding 
of a spur to the Arab gas pipeline. Nevertheless, the likelihood 
is that Iraq will play a part if Nabucco is realised. Egypt may 
emerge as a small supplementary supplier, again through the 
extension of the Arab gas pipeline through Syria to Turkey, but 
its projected contribution of around 3 bcm would only top up a 
project that had attained pre-existing viability12. 
III. Central Asia’s contribution to the 
EU energy strategy13
 
Central Asia is therefore very much in the frame as a key resource 
base for the EU’s southern corridor strategy. The three gas rich 
states  in  the  region  are  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan, each with differing production and consumption 
profiles (see Table 1) and differing potential as gas exporters to 
Europe. 
Table 1: Gas production and consumption in Central Asia in billion 
cubic metres (bcm) (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2009)
2007 2008
Kazakhstan: Production 26.4 30.2
Kazakhstan: Consumption 19.5 20.6
Turkmenistan: Production 65.4 66.1
Turkmenistan: Consumption 21.3 19.0
Uzbekistan: Production 59.1 62.2
Uzbekistan: Consumption 45.9 48.7
(i) Kazakhstan
Estimates of Kazakhstan’s overall probable and proven reserve 
base range from 1.9 trillion cubic metres (tcm) according to 
BP, up to 3.7 tcm claimed by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, 
of which 2.5 tcm is proven14. This could rise to between 6 and 
8 tcm with the development of new fields. Over 70% of its 
reserves are located in the big three fields of Kashagan, Tengiz 
and Karachaganak, all conveniently located in the west of the 
country. 
Kazakhstan’s gas production in 2008 stood at approximately 
33 bcm but is projected to rise steeply to around 70 bcm by 
2015 and higher still by 2020 as Kashagan comes onstream, and 
Tengiz and Karachaganak move into new production phases. 
Gas production is associated with domestic oil production. Only 
45% of gas output is marketed to customers – the remainder 
is  flared,  re-injected  to  enable  liquids  to  be  extracted,  or 
converted for petrochemical use. Moreover, domestic demand 
is rising as gas is increasingly used for local power generation, 
mirroring the domestic gasification strategies of several post-
Soviet states, led by Russia. 
In 2008, Kazakhstan exported approximately 15 bcm to Ukraine 
and Russia through KazRosGaz, a 50/50 joint venture between 
state oil and gas company KazMunaiGaz and Gazprom. Volumes 
likely to be available for annual export in the period 2015-20 
are likely to be between 20 bcm and 30 bcm depending on the 
proportions re-injected, converted to petrochemical use, or 
used to service domestic demand. 
Of this availability, 15 bcm is likely to go to Russia in line with 
existing agreements. Given that President Nazarbayev insisted 
that gas from the Karachaganak field be exported to Russia’s 
Orenburg  gas  processing  plant,  notwithstanding  that  the 
field’s operator BG had earmarked some of these volumes for 
re-injection or conversion to petrochemical use, it is unlikely 
that Kazakhstan will set aside its supply agreements with Russia 
lightly15. Of the remaining 5 to 15 bcm some, if not all, should be 
expected to go east on completion of current pipeline projects 
connecting Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to China, which will 
jointly have a capacity of 40 bcm. 
The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that Kazakh gas cannot 
be relied upon in any significant volume for European use up to 
2020 and, even beyond that, scope is limited. 
Summary:  This  section  finds  that  the  commercial  energy 
relationship between the EU and Central Asia will be structured 
around  gas  above  other  hydrocarbons  and  minerals.  More 
specifically, it would entail the provision of medium- to long-
term volumes of around 15 bcm annually to supplement the core 
supply base from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II project. The crucial 
Central  Asian  state  in  this  equation  is  Turkmenistan,  which 
alone has the requisite volume availability for export. As such, 
the initial finding of this paper is that Turkmenistan should be 
the EU’s strategic priority for engagement on energy issues. 8  EUCAM Working Paper No. 2
(ii) Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s current probable and proven gas reserve base 
is estimated to be between 1.58 and 2.1 tcm16. This is likely 
to be an underestimate, particularly as there are promising 
prospective structures in the Aral Sea basin and Ust Yurt plateau 
in western Uzbekistan, which could potentially be linked quite 
comfortably  to  the  broader  regional  transit  infrastructure. 
Uzbekistan has adopted a state-led development model, which 
has been suited to domestic requirements but not ambitions it 
has to be a regional exporter. 
The principal foreign investors in Western regions at present 
are Lukoil, Gazprom (through its Zarubzhneft subsidiary) and 
the Malaysian national oil company Petronas, which heads a 
consortium of Russian and East Asian companies involved in 
exploration and Gas to Liquids (GTL) production in the Aral Sea 
and Ust Yurt regions. Overall production levels are around 60 
bcm per year, of which around 80% is consumed domestically. Of 
the export volumes of 11-12 bcm, a small amount is exported to 
Central Asian neighbours and the remainder has been bought 
by Gazprom. 
Export volumes are projected, by the Uzbek government, to 
rise to around 15 bcm in 2015 and 20 bcm by 2020, which is a 
realistic target assuming the relevant investment is forthcoming. 
There is a small amount of spare capacity but an agreement was 
reached between President Karimov and Russian Prime Minister 
Putin in September 2008 to move to a European pricing formula 
for Uzbek exports, and to construct a new gas pipeline alongside 
the existing Central Asia-Center and Bukhara-Urals pipelines to 
take up the extra volume. 
President  Karimov  emphasised  throughout  2008  that  Uzbekistan 
would, in future, sell its (non-regional) export gas exclusively to 
Russia, either at the Uzbek or Kazakh borders, and expressed 
contentment  with  the  in-country  activities  of  Lukoil,  the 
nominally independent Russian energy company. Moreover, EU 
energy companies have a very limited foothold in Uzbekistan. 
Only two companies are active: UK-listed Rosehill Energy, which 
works on a service contract extracting oil in the North Urtabulak 
field,  and  the  Czech  company  Eriell  Corporation,  which  is  drilling 
for gas condensate in the Kashkadarya region. 
The EU and European energy companies appear, therefore, to 
be in a weak place with Uzbekistan, a position compounded 
by the imposition of EU sanctions between 2005 and 2008 
(currently suspended) following the violent suppression by the 
government of an uprising in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan 
in May 2005, and the reluctance of European majors to take the 
reputational risk of working in a state prominently cited as one 
of the world’s worst human rights offenders. 
Uzbekistan’s domestic gas consumption profile means that it 
will never be a large volume exporter to the EU even if domestic 
political  and  sectoral  reforms  are  enacted.  Furthermore, 
Uzbekistan has proved to be an extremely challenging operating 
environment for Western investors, as the tortuous experience 
of  US  mining  company  Newmont  Mining  illustrated.  The  energy 
sector is a key arena for rent-seeking elites to secure revenue, 
and corruption is engrained at almost all levels. 
However, there is a case for keeping dialogue alive. President 
Karimov’s foreign policy has been punctuated by switchbacks 
rather  than  balance.  There  are  signs  that  Tashkent  wants 
to  put  economic  relations  with  the  EU  on  a  qualitatively 
different  footing.  Karimov  made  overtures  to  Italian  and 
Spanish companies to invest in the energy sector in May 2009, 
a  significant  departure  from  policy  over  the  past  decade. 
Uzbek representatives attended the EU’s Southern Corridor 
summit in Prague in May 2009. Clearly a tactical element is 
likely to be in play: Karimov has alternately sought distance 
and rapprochement with Russia over two decades, and the 
latest shifts in rhetoric may be designed to force Gazprom 
to increase the pace of its activity in its Ust Yurt/Aral region 
concessionary blocks, where its licenses have been threatened 
by revocation. However, the EU’s Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) with Uzbekistan does have an established 
energy dimension. EU energy companies should look beyond 
the incumbent regime to a potentially more outward-looking 
and reformist post-Karimov successor government, which may 
move towards a more consistent (and traditional) Central Asian 
foreign policy stance of balancing the influence of the major 
regional powers. Thus, while putting Uzbek export gas through 
the southern corridor remains a distant prospect at present, 
many of the fundamentals suggest that it could be a useful 
long-term (beyond 2025) supplementary supplier to Europe. 
(iii) Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan’s gas reserve base is unknown. Estimates range 
from BP’s conservative assessment of 2.67 tcm (BP) to the 
Turkmen government’s optimistic evaluation of 26 tcm. The 
independent audit (using a mixture of Soviet and newer data) 
conducted  in  2008  by  UK  company  Gaffney,  Cline  and  Associates 
of the south-eastern South Yolotan-Osman and Yashlar fields 
estimated their reserves at between 4 and 14 tcm. When adding 
in other onshore fields to be audited in 2009, then even working 
from  the  bottom  range  of  the  independent  audit,  earlier 
concerns about the adequacy of Turkmenistan’s reserve base 
appear to have been assuaged. The apparent shelving in June 
2009  of  the  Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India  (TAPI)  gas 
pipeline project over pricing differences and construction costs 
will only increase the available volumes for export to Europe.   
Gas  output  is  likely  to  be  around  70-80  tcm  in  2009  with  domestic 
consumption no higher than 20 bcm. Given that the reserve 
base is much higher and domestic demand is relatively low, a 
much higher proportion of production is available for export. 
The government has three export contracts. A small volume 
of around 7-9 bcm is exported through a dedicated export 
pipeline to Iran completed in 1997. China will receive between 
30 and 40 bcm per year from fields on the right bank of the 
Amu Darya once the Central Asia-China pipeline is completed 
and capacity increases, probably in 2012. Russia has a 25 year 
framework agreement for an escalating supply of gas (up to 80 
bcm per year), principally from the Dauletebad gas field, which 
transits  through  the  Central  Asia-Center  trunk  pipeline,  although 
production and pipeline capacity is currently nowhere near 
this amount, even with out disruptions. However, given that 
the export destination of gas from the South Yolotan/Osman The EU and Central Asia: Commercialising the Energy Relationship - Michael Denison  9
structure is unassigned (although Turkmenistan accepted a 
$3 billion soft loan from China on 6 June 2009 to develop the 
field), and that there is considerable scope for use of products 
from the Caspian coastal shelf, it is reasonable to assume that 
Turkmenistan is the indispensable state in any commercial gas 
trading between the EU and Central Asia. 
IV. Materialising the EU-Turkmenistan 
energy relationship
If the EU is to seriously activate the supply, purchase and 
investment objectives set out in SEER2, the RSP and the Baku 
Initiative, both it and EU energy companies will have to figure 
out how best to engage with Turkmenistan on transit, trade and 
investment issues. The EU has made a start, securing an MoU 
in April 2008 for the supply of 10 bcm annually to the EU, and 
building contacts with senior Turkmen officials, from President 
Gurbanguli Berdymuhammedov downwards.
The decision made by the European Parliament in April 2009 
(currently awaiting action by the Council) that the EU proceed 
with an Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) after several years of 
stalling was also significant in setting a new agenda. The PCA 
with Turkmenistan also requires ratification. This is likely to 
be linked to progress under the EU-Turkmenistan Human 
Rights dialogue strand (established in June 2008) in relation to 
Turkmenistan’s responsibilities under the Convention against 
Torture and treatment of prisoners. The Turkmen government’s 
renewed engagement with the UN Human Rights Council and 
the  Organisation  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE) 
since December 2008 has been encouraging. The diplomatic 
building blocks are slowly being put into place, therefore, for a 
more comprehensive and mature bilateral relationship. 
The EU next has to secure the gas itself and move it across 
the Caspian Sea: it is not at all clear whether there will be 
sufficient  offshore  volume  to  supply  10  bcm  or  more  per 
year in accordance with the MoU. RWE signed a framework 
agreement, presumably as precursor to a Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) in April 2009 for Block 23, an undisputed 
offshore  parcel  close  to  the  Turkmen  shore,  but  this  may 
have  been  a  “sweetener”  designed  to  demonstrate  the 
sufficient country commitment necessary to pitch for onshore 
concessions  over  time17.  Most  other  offshore  blocks,  apart 
from the Serdar/Kyapaz field in the central Caspian, which 
is  under  dispute  between  Azerbaijan  and  Turkmenistan, 
have attracted little interest and their prospects do not look 
particularly good18. Two options are thus unfolding: either 
onshore gas is secured, ideally from the South Yolotan field, 
and/or a concerted diplomatic effort is made to resolve the 
Serdar/Kyapaz issue. The EU should work on both fronts: 
firstly,  through  the  promotion  of  Azeri-Turkmen  dialogue 
which,  after  a  promising  thaw  in  2007,  has  now  stalled. 
Both parties have indicated a willingness to settle the matter 
and have indicated informal concessions but now appear to 
be in deadlock. If an agreement around joint development 
can be reached, then it would be possible to link offshore 
Azerbaijani infrastructure at Shah Deniz into Serdar/Kyapaz 
at an economic cost. Picking up other offshore gas products, 
perhaps from Kazakhstan further up the coast, may just prove 
sufficient. 
The other alternative is to bring across onshore gas from the 
east of the country. In March 2009, the Turkmen government 
announced  an  international  tender  for  the  construction  of 
an East-West internal gas pipeline from South Yolotan to the 
Caspian Sea. This could take gas north through the PreCaspiskiy 
pipeline to Kazakhstan and Russia or across the Caspian in some 
form. South Yolotan will be a very difficult field to develop on 
a technical level, which should create some pitching leverage 
for EU energy companies with the capital and expertise to work 
complex structures. While the Turkmen government will not (in 
public at least) entertain the idea of new onshore PSAs, it might 
be possible to work through a hybrid service contract/PSA 
model – the Turkmen petroleum law provides for Joint Activity 
Agreements (JAAs) – that would protect Turkmen sovereignty 
issues, while incentivising the best foreign investors to develop 
the country’s most challenging fields. 
Moving Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea is likely to be 
a contentious process: a formal Trans-Caspian pipeline will 
encounter serious and sustained opposition from Russia and 
Iran on environmental and sovereignty grounds. It may not 
be worth the trouble. Much safer politically is to ship gas in 
LNG, Gas to Liquids (GTL) or Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
form across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan by tanker. This will 
be expensive and require a sustained long-term investment 
commitment. However, the Turkmen government is keen to add 
value by processing its gas domestically. The tax advantages of 
setting up such facilities in the coastal Special Economic Zone 
are considerable. A third option is to link up existing Azeri and 
Turkmen subsea infrastructure with a number of short subsea 
pipes. This technical solution should not be as contentious as 
a new pipeline but might be able to transit sufficient volumes 
to satisfy the requirements of Nabucco. RWE and OMV, from 
Germany  and  Austria  respectively,  in  December  2008  established 
the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC), registered in 
London, as a block purchasing mechanism for Turkmen gas 
designed  to  provide  the  contractual  security  necessary  to 
finance these linkages. Regardless of the merits of the CDC 
approach – and it will need to be calibrated carefully so as not 
to breach the EU’s own competition rules - the EU and energy 
Summary: The secondary findings of this working paper are that 
there is both a role for the EU in Turkmenistan and a willingness 
on the part of the Turkmen, if only on a tactical level, to engage. 
The EU, with European energy companies, can up their game 
by: (i) actively seeking to resolve the long outstanding maritime 
boundary dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan; (ii) 
seeking to secure a supply commitment on gas volumes from 
specified sources flowing through the proposed East-West pipeline; 
(iii)  working  to  promote  EU  companies  as  the  best  technical 
and most environmentally responsible commercial partners to 
develop new onshore fields under a legal formula that protects 
all parties’ interests. For their part, EU energy companies must 
stay engaged and consider whether they would be prepared to 
work under commercial arrangements short of PSA and closer 
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companies will be required to work together more effectively to 
promote the optimum transit solution. 
Timing is also crucial: as of 20 July 2009, gas exports to Russia 
had not resumed following an explosion on the Central Asia-
Centre  trunk  pipeline  on  8  April  2009.  The  Turkmen  government 
is short of money and short of friends. The decision by the 
Chinese government to advance a $3 billion loan in June 2009 
to develop South Yolotan underlines the importance for the EU 
of using diplomatic “vacuums” to advance essential interests. 
Committing gas volumes west will be viewed in Moscow as a 
further erosion of influence in Turkmenistan and may provoke 
resistance both formally and through informal channels. The 
Turkmen government therefore needs cast-iron contractual 
guarantees to face down Russia. These can only be given if the 
relevant IGAs and HGAs are signed with all Nabucco project 
partners but, most importantly, with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
V. Building a sustainable and ethical 
European business offer
SEER2 implicitly acknowledges that the EU must eliminate 
various competitive disadvantages if it wishes to buy gas directly 
from Central Asian suppliers. The governments of Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan prefer certain ways of doing business, which 
entail:
sale of gas at their border; 1 
sale to single rather than multiple entities, particularly state  2 
owned oil and gas companies;
long-term political framework agreements on sale, within  3 
which adjustments on tariffs and volumes can be made 
either annually or semi-annually depending on internal 
production factors, domestic requirements and prevailing 
market conditions.
CDC is a response to these preferences: a mechanism to build 
confidence  and  trust  and  provide  the  security  of  demand 
necessary  to  produce  long-term  supply  commitments. 
Moreover, OMV Gas & Power and RWE Supply & Trading in 
December  2008  established  the  Caspian  Energy  Company 
(CEC) in the UK as a corporate mechanism to explore the 
transit of Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea. The Commission 
is supportive of CDC and CEC and is establishing a parallel 
political track, which includes a feasibility study, although there 
is concern that the Commission will move too slowly to seize 
the commercial moment and may, in effect, prove a hindrance. 
Nevertheless, CDC and CEC are an important recognition that 
to succeed commercially in Turkmenistan (and Uzbekistan) it 
must be imaginative and flexible enough to understand local 
preferences. 
However, building closer, politically backed business ties into the 
region creates risks: for the EU the risk is that it sees progress on 
human rights and democratisation in the region where it does 
not exist. “Whitewashing” the record of local regimes or over-
promoting phantom or cosmetic reforms, as senior EU officials 
have been prone to do on their recent visits to Ashgabat, may 
compromise the EU’s aspiration to be a model international 
power and a normative foreign policy actor. Publicly listed 
European energy companies face a similar reputational risk in 
doing business with repressive regimes.
To work through this risk requires an initial shared recognition 
between  the  Commission,  Parliament,  member  state 
governments and commercial actors that, first of all, Central 
Asian governments fall short, often substantially, in attaining 
international norms of acceptable conduct, as set out in their 
responsibilities as full members of the UN and OSCE. Secondly, 
there must be a shared commitment between these parties 
to improve regime behaviour by seeking to embed norms of 
responsible sovereignty through adherence to basic standards 
of human rights. This does not involve prescriptions on types 
and pacing of democratisation but is designed to prevent the 
exercise of arbitrary governance that is as harmful to good 
business practice as it is to the rights of local citizens. Once 
these points of departure are agreed, the question is how, not 
whether, improvements should and can be sought. 
Critical to understanding this problem is to look at the leverage 
of the regimes themselves. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
will, in the near-term, have readily available export markets to 
both Russia and China (and maybe, in future, South Asia) that 
will provide a sufficient inflow of export revenues to satisfy 
domestic patronage networks and rent-seeking elites. These 
relationships extract no behavioural conditionalities: indeed, 
they thrive on opaque transactions and informal networks. In 
other words, the pressure points available to the EU are severely 
circumscribed; the Turkmen and Uzbek regimes can survive 
with or without Europe, as they have proven since 1992. Instead, 
therefore, the emphasis must shift to incentivisation. 
The biggest card European energy companies can play is their 
technical excellence and efficiency, but they must also build 
into their commercial offers the norms and tools of long-term 
political  and  social  development,  through  comprehensive 
packages of targeted training, education and welfare provision 
with clear linkages and impact beyond the energy sector. By 
doing so, they will meet local content requirements, build a 
more efficient local workforce, and foster the development 
of a middle-class likely to engender broader social progress. 
Integral to this process is assistance on specific technical issues, 
for example, in developing a framework of commercial law 
Summary:  Operating  in  Central  Asia  successfully  is  possible 
in the energy sector. The EU and European energy companies 
have realised that simply isolating or “punishing” Central Asian 
regimes does not effect behaviour change. Rather, an embryonic 
strategy for commercial engagement on energy issues is emerging 
that moves beyond the sterile “interests versus values” debate 
to secure energy needs through application of normative values 
in business practice and diplomatic engagement. The Caspian 
Development Corporation is a step towards understanding the 
local business environment, while the CSR offers being formulated 
by  European  majors  interested  in  working  in  Turkmenistan 
recognise the importance of the social dimension. In this respect, 
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administered by a competent judiciary. There must also be 
recognition that investment benefits should be spread across 
regions rather than geographically focused on areas close to 
field operations or the capital city. Thus, for European investors, 
the building of social capital cannot be simply an arm of the 
companies’ corporate social responsibility functions. Rather it 
should be seen as an effective instrument of reputational risk 
mitigation that has long-term commercial value.
Finally,  successful  Western  investors  in  Turkmenistan  have 
normally followed a basic set of ground rules, which should be 
respected. These include:
no involvement in domestic political activity, which  (i) 
should be left to diplomatic actors
a robust corporate position on the issue of bribery and  (ii) 
side-payments
avoidance  of  local  pressure  on  recruitment  by  (iii) 
using international country managers on long-term 
contracts
delivery on time and to budget (particularly important  (iv) 
where there is frequent turnover of state officials)
assiduous  compliance  with  environmental,  safety,  (v) 
local content, employment and tax legislation, and an 
assistance offer to build local capacity in these areas
working commercial disputes through the domestic  (vi) 
court system regardless of the competence or bias of 
the judiciary to demonstrate respect and incrementally 
improve the capacity of the local court systems to hear 
commercial cases
high ratio of local employment (vii) 
comprehensive (international)  training programmes  (viii) 
for local employees
build/import, operate and transfer in relation to plant (ix) 
use of state insurance schemes if necessary in addition  (x) 
to external insurance cover
VI. Recommendations to the EU
Work intensively to resolve downstream contractual issues  1. 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan in order to give Central Asian 
gas suppliers the confidence to move gas west in the face 
of likely Russian pressure.
Offer  to  assist  in  brokering  a  settlement  on  territorial  2. 
disputes between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan that would 
unlock vital offshore gas volumes. 
Prioritise  Turkmenistan  as  a  commercial  partner  of  3. 
choice  through  a  range  of  diplomatic  interventions 
and  confidence-building  measures  including  concrete 
proposals on transit and trade: the Turkmen government 
requires direction, reliability and certainty following which 
it will respond positively, as has been the case with China. 
Support  human  rights  observance  both  formally  and  4. 
in more nuanced ways by promoting the integration of 
social and environmental capital building measures into 
commercial engagement.
Establish a standing mechanism for dialogue between the  5. 
Commission,  European  Parliament  and  representatives 
of EU energy companies to share information, improve 
standards  of  transparency  and  accountability,  and 
coordinate commercial and political engagement. 
Identify where Turkmen gas would be sourced from and  5. 
work  to  provide  technical  assistance  on  upstream  and 
midstream development by reorienting external spend at 
the next budget allocation round in November 2009.
Support CDC and CEC more explicitly as volume-building  6. 
mechanisms for gas purchase and transit.
Work  to  define  transit  alternatives:  with  commercial  7. 
partners  cost,  finance  and  present  clear  plans  to  the 
Turkmen government.
Provide assistance on building a framework to support  8. 
inward investment by advising on petroleum, taxation, 
environmental, contract and local content legislation with 
appropriate improvements in judicial capacity.
Support  EU  energy  companies  in  defining  and  9. 
promoting their commercial offer of technical excellence, 
environmental impact management and corporate social 
responsibility and by informing them of mechanisms such 
as the Human Rights Dialogue. 
Remain  engaged  with  Kazakhstan  and  Uzbekistan  as  10. 
potential supplementary sources of gas for the Southern 
Corridor. 
Conclusion 
The objectives of this working paper were as follows: to review 
the EU’s current energy needs and to establish the role that 
Central Asia might play in helping to meet them. It concluded 
that Central Asia was not pivotal to EU energy strategy but would 
be an important component of the southern corridor project, 
which itself forms one component of the strategic review. The 
focus of interaction will be on gas and on Turkmenistan, as a 
supplementary  supplier  to  the  projected  Nabucco  pipeline 
and  therefore  a  useful  new  source  to  balance  dependence 
on Russian gas. Such a project will increase the commercial 
and geopolitical options, and presumably the market power, 
of Central Asian exporters themselves. The EU has moved 
constructively to develop relations with Turkmenistan since 
2007, but there are numerous technical, political, commercial 
and legal issues to resolve before Turkmen gas can be moved to 
Europe directly. Some of these risks are extrinsic to Central Asia, 
notably revolving around Turkey’s increasingly pivotal position 
as a Eurasian gas hub, and its relationship with Azerbaijan, or 
the extent to which individual EU member states prize good 
diplomatic and commercial relations with Russia. Resolving 
these will give the Turkmen government the confidence to take 
its own risks in the form of sending future export volumes west 
in the face of potential Russian opposition. 
Other issues are intrinsic to the region: securing gas volumes, 
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building  the  appropriate  commercial  relationships  that  will 
secure  long-term  supply  commitments.  Individually  they 
appear surmountable. Put together they present a formidable 
set of thresholds to cross. It cannot, therefore, be said with 
certainty that the southern corridor will be realised, or that 
the  Nabucco  pipeline  will  be  built.  However,  the  stars  are 
now more closely in alignment than ever before, and there is a 
strong case for arguing that, if the EU is committed to supply 
diversification, it should continue to force the pace and volume 
of engagement in order to keep up with emerging commercial 
opportunities in the region. 
The EU has rightly identified energy as a pivotal source of 
interaction between Europe and Central Asia. Progress has been 
made, both by the EU and its constituent energy companies, 
to  establish  a  working  relationship  on  a  governmental  and 
commercial  relationship.  However,  for  a  commercial  relationship 
to develop and prosper, the EU needs to act more quickly, more 
deliberately and more strategically in support of commercial 
activity both as a mechanism to improve energy security and 
as an opportunity to pursue the EU’s normative foreign policy 
objectives. 
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